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IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kenneth Flowerdew appeals contending the district court erred in overruling his 
objections to two instances of prosecutorial misconduct, wherein the prosecutor 
inappropriately attempted to enflame the passion and prejudices of the jury by 
mischaracterizing and disparaging the defense argument and by drawing inferences 
and thus, argued facts that were not in the record. He also asserts the district court 
erred by admitting a diagram as an illustrative exhibit even though there was no 
indication the officer needed it to adequately describe the facts to the jury. He contends 
each error justifies vacating the judgment of conviction. However, even if they are 
individually harmless, he asserts the cumulative harm caused by those errors still 
requires relief. 
The State raises several arguments in response to these points. However, its 
arguments are not persuasive and are contradictory to established precedent. Thus, 
this Court should reject those arguments, it should vacate the judgment of conviction, 
and remand this case for a new trial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Flowerdew's Appellant's Brief. With an exception to clarify the timeline vis-a-vis 
the allegations levied against Mr. Flowerdew because of the way those facts are 
presented in the Respondent's Brief, they need not be repeated in this Reply Brief. The 
statement of facts and course of proceedings from the Appellant's Brief are otherwise 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
The State specifically alleged that Mr. Flowerdew had "willfully and unlawfully 
upon the person of Ferry Officer Willie Cowell, by 
kicking him in the groin area ... " (R., p.43.) According to Officer Cowell's testimony, 
the only point at which Mr. Flowerdew allegedly kicked him in the groin area was after 
the officers had subdued Mr. Flowerdew and rolled him onto his side. (See Tr. Vol.2, 
p.135, Ls.5-1 O; see generally Tr.) Neither Agent Grainger nor Sergeant Strangio 
recalled seeing any inappropriate action on Mr. Flowerdew's part after he was subdued 
and rolled onto his side. (Tr., Vol.2, p.200, Ls.12-15; Tr., Vol.2, p.215, Ls.10-12.) 
Neither testified to hearing anything problematic at that time either. (See generally Tr.) 
However, both had testified to hearing screams or cries during the struggle. For 
example, Agent Grainger testified that, "while we were on the ground rollin' around," 
Officer Cowell cried out as though "a breath of air [was] coming out of his body." 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.200, Ls.18-24.) Similarly, when Sergeant Strangio arrived on scene, he 
heard what he described as a "blood curdling scream." (Tr., Vol.2, p.211, Ls.3-5.) 
However, he was still some distance away from the struggle and, as it was foggy, he 
was unable to see who had screamed. (See Tr., VoL2, p.211, L.3 - p.212, L.10.) 
Officer Cowell did acknowledge that he had been tasing Mr. Flowerdew and striking 
him with a flashlight before the sergeant arrived. (Tr., Vol.2, p.124, L.15 - p.125, L.3; 
Tr., Vol.2, p.165, L.18 - p.166, L.4) Agent Grainger also acknowledged that, as a result 
of their efforts to subdue him, Mr. Flowerdew's face was submerged at times in the 
mud, and Mr. Flowerdew was complaining that he could not breathe. (Tr., Vol.2, p.203, 
Ls.3-22; Tr., Vol.2, p.199, Ls.4-5.) After hearing the scream, Sergeant Strangio 
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Whether the district court erred by overruling Mr. Flowerdew's objections 
instances of prosecutorial misconduct during the prosecutor's rebuttal argument 
2. Whether the district court erred by overruling Mr. Flowerdew's objections to the 
diagram of the truck drawn by Officer CowelL 
3. Whether the accumulated errors in this case require reversal even if this Court 




The District Court Erred By Overruling Mr. Flowerdew's Objections To Instances Of 
Prosecutorial Misconduct During The Prosecutor's Rebuttal Argument 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Disparaging Defense Counsel's 
Argument 
1. The Issue Of Misconduct Regarding Arguing The Prosecutor Disparaged 
And Mischaracterized The Defense Argument Was Preserved By Defense 
Counsel's Objection Below 
The State initially contends that Mr. Flowerdew's argument about "disparaging" 
the defense argument was not preserved for appeal because Mr. Flowerdew had only 
argued the prosecutor had committed misconduct by "mischaracterizing" the defense 
argument. (Resp. Br., p.9.) The State's argument is erroneous as it is directly contrary 
to established precedent In State v. Beebe, the Court of Appeals indicated that 
objecting on the grounds of misconduct preserves various particular arguments 
regarding why the statement constitutes misconduct, including both disparaging and 
mischaracterizing the defense argument. See State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 576 
(Ct. App. 2007). 
In Beebe, defense counsel had objected generically, asserting the prosecutor 
had committed misconduct, and the prosecutor was asked to rephrase the argument. 
Id. at 575 (specifically, defense counsel asserted, "that is misconduct I object and ask 
that that remark be stricken, [i]t is an appeal to-"). The prosecutor's rephrased 
argument asserted that accepting the defense argument would '"open[] the doors to 
people saying I'm allowed to commit crimes because of the mental illness I have."' Id. 
5 
counsel renewed the objection asserting, "this was not proper argument as it 
was an appeal to the passion and prejudices of the jury." Id. And, although defense 
counsel had not specifically argued that the prosecutor's statements mischaracterized 
or disparaged the defense, the Court of Appeals found misconduct and vacated the 
conviction specifically because the prosecutor had "grotesquely mischaracterized 
Beebe's defense that he had harbored no intent to frighten or use force against the clerk 
and that his bizarre behavior was, instead, the product of his mental illness. [The 
prosecutor's argument] disparaged and distorted his defense and was plain 
misconduct." Id. at 576 (emphasis added). Thus, the Beebe opinion reveals that an 
objection on the basis of misconduct is sufficient to allow different specific arguments 
explaining why the prosecutor's comments constitute misconduct to be made on appeal. 
See id. at 575-76. 
That holding in Beebe is consistent with the general rules regarding preservation 
of issues for appeal. As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, there is a distinction 
between "new arguments" and "new issues" on appeal: "While Brandt has made a very 
interesting argument on this issue ... , he has not demonstrated that this is a new 
issue, as opposed to a novel argument concerning an issue previously raised and 
decided on appeal. Seemingly, he presents a new theory which he wants applied to an 
old issue." Brandt v. State, 118 Idaho 350, 352 (1990) (emphasis from original). As 
such, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision dismissing that new 
argument because it was part of an issue that had already been resolved on direct 
appeal. Id. In doing so, the Idaho Supreme Court made it clear that arguments about 
how a certain issue should be resolved must actually be raised in the direct appeal 
6 
because the defendant cannot raise them in subsequent collateral attacks. See id 
accepting the State's arguments - that the "new arguments" under issue 
of misconduct cannot be considered on direct appeal - would create a Catch-22 with 
the Brandt decision. In direct appeals, this would vitiate the fundamental notions of due 
process - the opportunity to obtain a full and fair review of the issues on appeal - and 
so, cannot represent the actual state of the law. 1 
Additionally, a defendant may raise new arguments on appeal if they are 
associated with a preserved issue. See, e.g., State v. Bower, 135 Idaho 554, 557-58 
(Ct. App. 2001); Fairchild v. State, 128 Idaho 311, 316 (Ct App. 1996). For example, in 
Bower, the Court of Appeals explained, "the overarching 'issue' presented both to the 
trial court and on appeal ... is whether the officers' entry into the motel room violated 
the Fourth Amendment." Id Therefore, the Court held the State's specific arguments 
on appeal (regarding how the entry was not invalid), though not specifically argued by 
the prosecutor below, were still properly consider on appeal as part of the "overarching 
issue." Id. Similarly, in Fairchild, the Court of Appeals noted that the issue (the validity 
of a search warrant based on the statement of an undisclosed informant) had been 
discussed on direct appeal. Fairchild, 128 Idaho at 316. In refusing to consider that 
claim in post-conviction, the Court explained: "To the extent that Fairchild raises a new 
argument ... , we find that it is so related to issues addressed on direct appeal that it 
was, or should have been, settled during that appeal." Id. (emphasis added). 
1 The State's argument would mean that Respondents could not, for example, raise the 
contention of "correct result, wrong reason," since the argument on appeal about the 
proper reason would, by definition, not have been raised below. But see, e.g., 
State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 307 (2014) (applying the correct result, wrong reason 
analysis). 
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Thus, as Brandt, Fairchild, and Bower reveal, new arguments regarding how a 
issue should resolved are properly raised in the appeal. See id. 
to the extent Mr. Flowerdew even raised a new argument, compare Beebe, 145 
Idaho 576 (indicating that mischaracterizing and disparaging the defense argument are 
part of the same argument), he has simply done what the Idaho appellate courts have 
already approved - raised additional arguments about how the issue raised below 
should be resolved on appeal. 
Therefore, his arguments regarding the prosecutorial misconduct resulting from 
the comments disparaging the defense argument are preserved for appeal by defense 
counsel's objection asserting misconduct. Those arguments, which specifically explain 
why those statements constitute misconduct are, as the Court of Appeals has put it, "so 
related to issues addressed" below that they are part of that "overarching issue." Id. at 
557-58; Fairchild, 128 Idaho at 316. As a result, they are properly before the district 
court in this appeal. 
2. The Prosecutor's Statements Constituted Attempts To Enflame The 
Passion And Prejudices Of The Jury, And So, Constitutes Misconduct 
Regardless Of Whether Those Comments Were Directed At Defense 
Counsel Personally Or At The Defense Arguments 
The State's response to the merits of this claim focuses primarily on the idea 
that, because the prosecutor was trying to respond to the defense's closing argument, 
and not directed at defense counsel personally, the prosecutor's statements somehow 
did not constitute misconduct. (Resp. Br., pp.10-12.) It almost exclusively relies on the 
decision in State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 188-89 (Ct. App. 2011 ), in support of this 
argument. (See Resp. Br., pp.10-12.) However, the State misunderstands the holding 
8 
in Norton, particularly in light of controlling Idaho Supreme Court precedent When 
Norton is properly read, such that it is consistent with that precedent, it does not support 
the State's argument 
The reason for the State's confusion is the conclusory nature of the Norton 
Court's discussion on this issue. See Norton, 151 Idaho at 188-89. Its entire discussion 
of this claim reads: 
Norton next asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by referring 
to the defense arguments as red herrings and smoke and mirrors. Neither 
party cites to Idaho case law for the proposition that such an argument 
does or does not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. Norton maintains, 
however, that such an argument "is an impermissible attack intended to 
encourage the jury to focus on the conduct of defense counsel rather than 
on the evidence of guilt." Norton does note in her reply brief that, in Idaho, 
the prosecutor's closing argument should not include disparaging 
comments about opposing counsel. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 
156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct.App.2007). See also State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 
267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003); State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 69, 951 
P.2d 1288, 1296 (Ct.App.1998); State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 651,657,691 
P.2d 1266, 1272 (Ct.App.1984). The prosecutor's comments here were 
not directed at defense counsel personally, but rather were comments on 
the defense theories. We conclude that the prosecutor's rebuttal 
argument referring to some of defense counsel's arguments as red 
herrings and smoke and mirrors was not misconduct. 
Id. As such, the Norton decision does not explain what it was about the fact that the 
comments were directed at defense counsel personally, rather than at the defense 
arguments, which showed the prosecutor in that case was not seeking to enflame the 
passion or prejudices of the jury, so as to get them to render a verdict on factors other 
than the evidence provided. See id. 
However, such an exposition is necessary because that is the critical question at 
issue when there are allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. "Prosecutorial 
misconduct occurs when the prosecutor 'attempts to secure a verdict on any factor 
9 
than ... the evidence admitted during the trial, including reasonable inferences 
be drawn therefrom.' It also occurs when the prosecutor '[a]ppeals to emotion, 
passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics."' State v. Abdullah, 
158 Idaho 386, 466-67 (2015) (quoting State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010), and 
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 62 (2011) respectively); cf State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 
934, 941 (1994) (identifying the same definition of prosecutorial misconduct). Thus, 
regardless of whether the prosecutor's comments are directed at defense counsel or at 
the defense argument, if those comments encourage the jury to decide the case on 
factors other than the evidence (such as their passion or prejudice against the defense 
argument), they still constitute misconduct. See id. 
Thus, the only way the Norton decision can properly be understood so that it is 
consistent with this well-established Idaho Supreme Court precedent is that the Norton 
Court determined the comments in that case, which were directed at the defense 
argument, were not attempting to inflame the passion or prejudices of the jury. 
See Norton, 151 Idaho at 188-89. Basically, what the Norton decision can properly be 
read to say is that the prosecutor, by labelling the defendant's arguments as "red 
herrings and smoke and mirrors," was asserting the defense argument in that case was 
drawing the jury's attention away from the central facts of the case, and in so doing, the 
prosecutor hoped to refocus the jury on the central facts. See id. Since, in that context, 
that sort of argument is a call to decide the case on the evidence, it would be proper 
argument. See, e.g., State v. Contreras-Gonzales, 146 Idaho 41, 49 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(finding no misconduct because, "[i]n context, it appears the prosecutor was merely 
10 
trying to draw the jury's attention to the critical elements of the case that it should be 
examining ") 
However, that is not what the prosecutor's problematic statements did in 
Mr. Flowerdew's case, and therefore, Norton is inapplicable. Here, the prosecutor 
argued: 'That's the [defense] argument is [sic] that we don't want Officers to investigate 
anything. We don't want them to protect the public. We don't want them to prevent 
crime." (Tr., Vol.2, p.272, L.21 - p.273, L.3.) That argument is not trying to redirect the 
jury to the elements of the offense, like Contreas-Gonzales or Norton. Rather, it is 
almost identical to the arguments found to be improper in Beebe and Timmons because 
it constitutes an attempt to enflame the passion and prejudices of the jurors.2 Compare 
Beebe, 145 Idaho at 576 (holding the comment "open[ing] the doors to people saying 
I am allowed to commit crimes because of the mental illness I have," was misconduct); 
State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 291-92 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the 
comment "[t]he defendant's argument is this is simply a case of going after somebody 
because their child doesn't dress well, doesn't have money, I think that argument 
speaks for itself," constitutes misconduct). 
Thus, the prosecutor's comments in this case were attempts to enflame the 
passion and prejudice of the jurors and get them to decide the case on factors other 
than the evidence - namely provoking an emotional reaction against the 
sensationalized version of defense counsel's argument. (See Tr., Vol.2, p.272, 
2 Based on the fact that there is this relevant Idaho case law on point which identifies 
the statements at issue in this case as misconduct, this case is further distinguishable 
from Norton, where "[n]either party cites to Idaho case law for the proposition that such 
an argument does or does not constitute prosecutorial misconduct." Norton, 151 Idaho 
at 189. 
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L.21 - p.273, L.3.) That constitutes misconduct under the definition set forth by the 
Supreme Court. See Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 466-67. 
B. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Drawing Inferences About, And 
Subsequently Arguing, Facts Not In Evidence 
The prosecutor also committed misconduct by drawing inferences from facts 
which were unsupported by the evidence presented to the jury when he argued that the 
reason Mr. Flowerdew ran from officers was "because he wanted to take that 
methamphetamine and run with that methamphetamine." (See App. Br., pp.13-16) 
The State's response on that point centers on the fact the prosecutor was trying to 
respond to defense counsel's argument that Mr. Flowerdew had run for fear he was 
being falsely accused of possessing the drugs. (See Resp. Br., pp.12-15.) The State's 
argument in that regard is flawed for two reasons. First, the fact that the prosecutor was 
trying to respond to defense counsel's argument does not justify an improper argument 
on the prosecutor's part. Second, the prosecutor's statement does not, as the State 
believes, solely contradict defense counsel's argument in that regard. 
The State's first argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the license 
afforded to the prosecutor in closing argument. Just because the prosecutor is 
responding to an argument by defense counsel does not given him license to commit 
misconduct. See, e.g., Beebe, 145 Idaho at 574-76 (finding misconduct in the 
prosecutor's response to the defense's closing argument). Even if defense counsel 
made inappropriate argument,3 two wrongs do not make a right. 
3 The State actually recognizes that defense counsel's argument was proper. (Resp. 
Br., p.15.) 
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As the Idaho Supreme Court has long since recognized, it is the prosecutor's 
"see that [defendants] have a fair and impartial trial and to avoid convictions 
contrary to law. Nothing should tempt him to . make statements the jury, which, 
whether true or not, have not been proved." State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87 (Ct App. 
2007) (quoting State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44 (1903)). Therefore, regardless of 
whether he is responding to defense counsel's arguments, the prosecutor cannot argue 
facts which are not in evidence. Id. If the prosecutor does so, as happened in 
Mr. Flowerdew's case, the prosecutor is seeking a conviction contrary to law, depriving 
the defendant of a fair and impartial trial, and so, is committing misconduct. See id.; 
see also Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 466-67. As such, regardless of the argument defense 
counsel made, the prosecutor's rebuttal closing statements need to be assessed on 
their own merits for misconduct. 
The prosecutor's statements in this case do not withstand that scrutiny. There 
were no facts in the record indicating what Mr. Flowerdew was intending when he ran. 
However, the prosecutor's response drew the inference and argued non-existent facts 
as a result of that inference: that Mr. Flowerdew "wanted to take that methamphetamine 
and run." (See Resp. Br., p 15 (discussing Tr., Vol.2, p.273, Ls.8-15) (emphasis 
added).) 
The facts do not support the prosecutor's inference. Officer Cowell testified he 
had placed the suspected methamphetamine back on the floorboard of the car. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.119, Ls.18-21.) Additionally, when Mr. Flowerdew ran, Officer Cowell had 
control over one of Mr. Flowerdew's arms, and Mr. Flowerdew used his other arm to 
push past Officer Cowell. (Tr., Vol.2, p.120, L.25 - p.121. L.8; Tr., Vol.2, p.122, Ls.6-7.) 
13 
there are no facts in the record indicating Mr. Flowerdew wanted to, or was able 
trying to, "take that methamphetamine [off the floor of the car] and run." As such, 
prosecutor's statements about Mr. Flowerdew's intent to that effect (Tr., VoL2, 
p.273, Ls.11-15), were not substantiated by the evidence actually presented in this 
case, and so, were improper. See Irwin, 9 Idaho at 43-44; Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87. 
Nevertheless, the State tries to frame the prosecutor's argument as a permissible 
inference, given a particular peripheral view of the facts. (Resp. Br., p.15 ("it was 
equally probable, as suggested by the prosecutor in rebuttal, that the reason 
[Mr.] Flowerdew asked to see the controlled substance was so that he could take the 
controlled substance with him when he ran away.") However, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has already held such attenuated interpretations of a closing argument are 
inappropriate. State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166 (1980) (abrogated on related 
grounds by State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 396 (1981)). 
The State tries to avoid the inevitable conclusion dictated by Griffiths by arguing 
that, in Griffiths, the argument was irrelevant to the issues in the case, whereas the 
prosecutor's argument here was directed at an element of the constructive possession 
charge. (Resp. Br., pp.15-17.) However, the fact that the prosecutor's statement might 
speak to an element of the offense does not make his argument proper. A prosecutor 
commits misconduct when he "make[sJ statements to the jury, which, whether true or 
not, have not been proved." Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87 (quoting Irwin, 9 Idaho at 43-44) 
(emphasis added). As discussed infra, the facts the prosecutor argued in regard to 
Mr. Flowerdew's purported intent had not been proved to the jury. 
14 
Since the ultimate truth of the fact, and thus, the applicability of the fact to an 
of the offense, is not proper argument if the underlying fact has not 
actually been proved to the jury, the prosecutor's argument in this case still constitutes 
misconduct even though the argument might speak to one of the elements of the case. 
Thus, the State's attempt to distinguish Griffiths is unavailing. As such, the conclusion 
from Griffiths is applicable here, and the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing 
those facts, which were not in evidence, during his rebuttal statements. 
C. The State Has Failed To Carry Its Burden To Prove Both Instances Of 
Prosecutorial Misconduct Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
Misconduct is prejudicial because it undermines the constitutional guarantee of 
due process. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987); State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 
309, 318 (Ct. App. 2005). However, the State contends the misconduct in this case was 
harmless for three reasons: the jury was instructed to decide the case on the evidence, 
Officer Cowell's testimony was not contradicted, and the prosecutor's statements do not 
address Officer Cowell's credibility. (Resp. Br., pp.17-20.) The State bears the burden 
to prove preserved errors harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho at 221-22. As such, it must 
show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that each of those errors did not contribute to the 
verdict rendered. Id. The State's arguments are meritless, as they are, respectively, 
contrary to precedent, based on a misrepresentation of the facts, and not focused on 
the harm caused by the misconduct itself. Therefore, it has failed to carry that burden in 
regard to each of the instances of prosecutorial misconduct in this case. 
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1. The State's First Harmlessness Argument Fails To Take Relevant Idaho 
And United States Supreme Court Precedent Into Account 
The State asserts that, because was instructed the arguments of counsel 
were not evidence and it was to decide the case only on the evidence, the prosecutorial 
misconduct in this case could not have prejudiced the defendant. (Resp. Br., p.17.) 
While there may be a presumption that the jurors follow instructions given, the Court of 
Appeals has explained, "application of th[at] presumption does not always end the 
inquiry." State v. Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, 767 (Ct. App. 2012); cf. State v. Wrenn, 99 
Idaho 506, 510 (1978) (finding that, given the prejudicial nature of the error, "the 
presumption of the efficaciousness of cautionary warnings" was overcome). 
Rather, as the Watkins Court explained: "although we normally presume that a 
jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence, this presumption 
cannot shield all errors from appellate review, regardless of the severity of the error or 
the forcefulness and effectiveness of the instruction." Id. That conclusion is consistent 
with United States Supreme Court precedent, which provides: "there are some contexts 
in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the 
consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human 
limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored." Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 
135 (1968); cf Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 171 (1994) (reaffirming 
Bruton on this point). 
By its definition, prosecutorial misconduct falls under the Bruton exception 
discussed in Watkins. That is because prosecutorial misconduct is defined as the 
prosecutor actually attempting to play on "the practical and human limitations of the jury 
system," so that the jurors will decide the case on factors that are beyond the scope of 
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the evidence and instructions given See, e.g., Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 466-67. 
Additionally, when a prosecutor engages in misconduct, he deprives the defendant of 
constitutional right to a fair trial. Greer, 483 U.S. at 765; Sanchez, 142 Idaho at 318. 
Thus, "the consequences of failure [are] so vital to the defendant, that the practical and 
human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored," when a prosecutor is 
improperly exploiting the limitations of that system. Therefore, the Bruton exception 
applies to claims of prosecutorial misconduct. 
At the very least, because the State bears the burden to prove this error 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the State would have to make some showing that 
the jury did, in fact, follow the instructions given. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 221-22 
(defining the burden of proof regarding objected-to error). However, the State has 
made no such showing in this case. Given the realities recognized in Bruton and its 
progeny, there is, at least, a reasonable possibility that the jury was swayed by the 
prosecutor's improper statements and rendered the verdict against Mr. Flowerdew 
based, in part, on the prosecutor's improper comments. As such, the State has failed to 
carry its burden to prove the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and this Court 
should remand the case for a new, fair trial. 
2. The State's Second Harmlessness Argument Is Based On A 
Misrepresentation Of The Facts 
The State also tries to argue that these errors were harmless because Officer 
Cowell's credibility was not a significant issue, based on the State's belief that Officer 
Cowell's testimony was not contradicted by the other officers. (Resp. Br., pp.18-19.) 
The State is mistaken. According to Officer Cowell, there was only one point at which 
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Mr. Flowerdew purportedly kicked him in the groin - after the officers had subdued 
Flowerdew and rolled him onto his , Vol.2, p.135, Ls.5-1 O; see generally 
Agent Grainger, who was also sitting right by Mr. Flowerdew at that time, expressly 
denied seeing Mr. Flowerdew "use his leg to move in a striking action towards 
anybody." (Tr., Vol.2, p.200, Ls.12-15.) Additionally, he testified the only time he heard 
anything problematic from Officer Cowell was "while we were on the ground rollin' 
around." (Tr., Vol.2, p.200, Ls.16-24.) Sergeant Strangio's testimony was similar, 
though less explicit. He simply testified that, once they subdued Mr. Flowerdew, he 
helped secure the scene and left; he did not mention seeing or hearing anything 
troubling during that time. (Tr., Vol.2, p.215, Ls.8-12.) Thus, the State's assertion that 
the other officers were not contradicting Officer Cowell (Resp. Br., p.18) 
supported by the evidence. 
is not 
The timing of the kick is actually a critical factor in this case. During the struggle, 
the officers' attempts to subdue Mr. Flowerdew resulted in Mr. Flowerdew's face being 
submerged in the mud at various points. (Tr. Vol.2, p.203 Ls.3-22 (Agent Grainger 
admitting that fact).) Both Agent Grainger and Officer Cowell admitted that they heard 
Mr. Flowerdew say he could not breathe during the struggle. (Tr., Vol.2, p.199, Ls.4-5; 
Tr., Vol.2, p.133, Ls.20-21.) Part of Mr. Flowerdew's defense at trial was that, if he had 
happened to kick Officer Cowell during the struggle, it was not an intentional action, but 
rather, an unintentional reaction because he was trying to get his face out of the mud so 
he would be able to breathe. (Tr., Vol.2, p.268, Ls.16-22.) Since battery requires a 
willful act, the conviction would be improper Officer Cowell was only struck 
unintentionally as Mr. Flowerdew was fighting for breath. (See App. Br., pp.24-27 
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(explaining this argument in more detail).) Thus, Officer Cowell's credibility in regard to 
the strike occurred was just as important as whether he was Since 
misconduct was meant to get the jury to disregard the defense argument, the 
misconduct in that regard was not harmless. 
To get around this problem, the State framed the timeline of the facts as follows: 
"When the officers rolled [Mr.] Flowerdew on his side he .. forcefully kneed the officer 
in the groin. Agent Grainger did not see [Mr.] Flowerdew knee Officer Cowell, but he 
heard Officer Cowell cry out in pain. Another officer, Sergeant Mark Strangio, arrived 
on scene to assist at approximately the same time and heard 'a blood curdling scream."' 
(Resp. Br., p.4 (internal record citations omitted).) However, the officers' testimony 
reveal that is a misrepresentation of the order in which those events occurred. 
Agent Grainger specifically rejected the idea that he heard Officer Cowell cry out 
in pain after Mr. Flowerdew was subdued; he testified it was while they were "on the 
ground rollin' around." (Tr., Vol.2, p.200, Ls.16-24.) Similarly, Sergeant Strangio 
testified that he heard the scream when he initially arrived on scene. (Tr., Vol.2, p.211, 
Ls.1-6.) He was some distance away from the fight when he heard the scream since, 
after hearing it, "I ran to the sound where the screaming was coming from." (Tr., Vol.2, 
p.212, Ls.2-3.) He also testified that it was foggy. (Tr., Vol.2, p.211, L.3.) Thus, his 
testimony reveals he could not see the fight, much less identify who had screamed. 
(See also Tr., Vol.2, p.211, Ls.17-25 (testifying he believed the scream meant there had 
been a shooting despite no evidence of shots being fired).) Additionally, the fact that 
the sergeant proceeded to help the other officers subdue Mr. Flowerdew (see Tr., Vol.2, 
p.212, L.7 - p.215, L.7), also indicates the State's characterization of the facts is 
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erroneous. As such, this Court should reject the State's second argument that the error 
was harmless because that argument is based on a misunderstanding of the facts. 
3. The State's Third Harmlessness Argument Regarding The Instances Of 
Misconduct Does Not Address The Specific Harm Arising From The 
Misconduct Itself 
Finally, the State argues that, since the comments constituting the misconduct 
were not expressly calling for the jury to find Officer Cowell particularly credible, the 
error was harmless. (Resp. Br., pp.18-19.) That argument is meritless. The 
statements constituting misconduct were trying to get the jury to disregard the defense 
theory of the case on bases other than the evidence actually presented. (See Tr., Vol.2, 
p.272, L.21 - p.273, L.3 (disparaging and mischaracterizing the defense argument); 
Tr., Vol.2, p.273, Ls.8-15 (arguing facts not in evidence).) The harm created by that sort 
of inappropriate conduct is a deprivation of due process. See Greer, 483 U.S. at 765; 
Sanchez, 142 Idaho at 318. Thus, to show harmlessness, the State would have to 
show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility the jury did 
not reject the defense argument, and so, convict Mr. Flowerdew, on that improper 
ground. 
However, the issue of Officer Cowell's credibility, upon which the State tries to 
rely to show harmlessness in regard to the prosecutorial misconduct, is more directed at 
the third error in this case - the erroneous admission of the diagram - which will be 
discussed in depth in Section II, infra. Thus, the State had not actually offered any 
argument that the two instances of prosecutorial misconduct were harmless. Compare 
State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598-99 (2013). Therefore this Court should vacate the 
judgment of conviction in this case. 
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IL 
The District Court Erred By Overruling Mr. Flowerdew's Objections To The Diagram Of 
The Truck Drawn By Officer Cowell 
The State's Argument Regarding The Relevance Of The Diagram Ignores The 
Established Standards Governing Legal Relevance Of Proposed Demonstrative 
Exhibits 
The district court overruled Mr. Flowerdew's objection to the introduction of 
Officer Cowell's diagram even though there was no indication that Officer Cowell was 
unable to describe where in the car he found the drugs without that diagram. In arguing 
that the diagram was properly admitted as a demonstrative exhibit, the State simply 
claims that, because the diagram "was relevant for the purpose for which it was offered, 
- i.e., illustrating Officer Cowell's testimony," it was properly admitted as demonstrative 
evidence. (Resp. Br., p.29.) That argument ignores the standards set forth to 
determine legal relevance of such exhibits, and so, the State's argument should be 
rejected. 
To be admissible as evidence in a legal proceeding, a demonstrative exhibit must 
be more than a mere illustration of the testimony being offered. Rather, it must depict 
something that "a witness is unable, by means of words or gestures alone, to convey to 
a jury an accurate understanding of the physical facts" at issue in the testimony. 
Hook v. Homer, 95 Idaho 657, 660 (1973). Thus, although the diagram in this case was 
"illustrative," in that it was a pictorial representation of the facts about which Officer 
Cowell was testifying, that simple fact fails to satisfy the standard of admissibility and 
legal relevance set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Hook. The State has made no 
argument, below or on appeal, that the diagram was necessary because Officer Cowell 
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was "unable, by means of words or gestures alone, to convey to a jury an accurate 
of the physical facts. Id Therefore, the State's argument regarding the 
relevance, and thus, admissibility of the diagram is misdirected and improper. 
Furthermore, the State is the proponent of the evidence, it bears the burden of 
persuasion to demonstrate that the proposed evidence is, in fact, admissible. See, e.g., 
State v. Davis, 155 Idaho 216, 219 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing I.RE. 401) ("the proponent of 
the evidence must identify a nonhearsay purpose that has relevance to prove or 
disprove a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action."); cf 
Creamer v. Commonwealth, 767 S.E.2d 226, 230 (Va. Ct. App. 2015) (summarizing the 
rule best: "Before evidence is admitted, its proponent must lay a foundation supporting 
a finding that it is relevant to the proponent's theory of the case."). Thus, the State's 
assertion that "[Mr.] Flowerdew has failed to show the diagram was not relevant" (Resp. 
Br., p.31) is also an improper argument which inappropriately shifts the burden on this 
issue. 
Finally, the only point to which any such diagram might potentially be relevant 
was what Officer Cowell could actually see when he looked into the car. See 
State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764 (1993) (finding a demonstrative exhibit in a 
similar situation was relevant because it depicted the scene from the officer's 
viewpoint). However, the State offers no response to Mr. Flowerdew's argument on 
appeal that, since the diagram was not drawn from Officer Cowell's perspective, it could 
not be relevant to that fact. Compare id. Rather, the State tries to gloss over the issue 
by describing the diagram as having only "minor inaccuracies." (Resp. Br., pp.24-25.) 
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Incomplete and inaccurate depiction of the interior of the truck is precisely the 
problem with the exhibit regard this line of potential relevance - it had to depict to 
what Officer Cowell could actually see to be relevant. Since it did not, it was not In 
fact, that is the reason the video the State initially sought to use instead of the diagram 
was excluded. (R., p.66 (Mr. Flowerdew's motion to suppress the video); Tr., Vol.1, 
p.25, Ls.12-24 (the district court ruling on the motion).) The rules are no different for a 
still picture than they are for a motion picture - it still has to be relevant to the facts at 
issue, which is what Officer Cowell could see from the doorway when he looked into the 
truck. Since all the inaccuracies, both "minor" and major, reveal that the diagram does 
not speak to those facts, the diagram was not legally relevant to Officer Cowell's 
testimony, and so, was improperly admitted. 
B. The State Has Failed To Prove The Erroneous Admission Of The Diagram Was 
Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
The State bears the burden to prove this preserved errors harmless. Perry, 150 
Idaho at 221-22. This means that the State must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that there was not a reasonable possibility that error did not contribute to the verdict. Id. 
The State's argument contends that, because the jury acquitted on the possession 
charge, they did not attach any additional weight or Officer Cowell's testimony or hold 
him any more credible and so, the error is harmless. (Resp. Br., p.27.) That argument 
is erroneous, as it is an example of a correlation/causation fallacy (i.e., post hoc ergo 
propter hoc). 
The State's argument assumes a causal relationship between the jury's decision 
to acquit on the possession charge and Officer Cowell's credibility - that Officer Cowell 
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had to be deemed credible in order for the jury to convict on the possession charge. 
there are no facts showing those two ideas are related in that manner. 
Rather, the jury could easily have found Officer Cowell totally credible as to where the 
drugs were found in the truck and still found the State failed to prove Mr. Flowerdew had 
constructive possession over the drugs. This is a particularly reasonable conclusion, 
given that Mr. Flowerdew was simply the passenger in another person's truck. Thus, 
because the State's argument on harmless error is based on a logical fallacy, it has not 
proved the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Furthermore, to meet its burden in that regard, the State would have to show that 
the erroneous admission of the diagram did not contribute to the verdict. Perry, 150 
Idaho at 121. That means this Court must be able to say that '"the guilty verdict actually 
rendered in this trial was surely unattributible to the error."' State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 
11 (2013) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (emphasis from 
Sullivan). There is still a reasonable possibility that, by using the improper illustrative 
exhibit, Officer Cowell's overall credibility was raised in the eyes of the jury, regardless 
of whether it determined the State ultimately met its burden of proof on the possession 
charge. See Walter Probert, Courtroom Semantics, 5 Am. Jur. Trials 695, §107 
(database updated April 2015) (emphasis added). Officer Cowell's credibility was 
central to the two charges on which Mr. Flowerdew was convicted, and, as discussed 
infra, his testimony in that regard was contradicted. As a result, there is a reasonable 
possibility that the erroneous admission of the diagram, which bolstered Officer Cowell's 
credibility, contributed to the guilty verdict in this case, and so, was not harmless. 
Compare Joy, 155 Idaho at 11-12 (holding that, since the misconduct in that case 
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impacted the credibility determination and "the case is thus primarily based upon whose 
of events the jury believes," there was a reasonable possibility the misconduct 
contributed to the verdict). 
The State tries to refute that conclusion by pointing out that the jury was told the 
diagram was not to scale and the red X markings were only approximations. (Resp. 
Br., pp.32-33.) Again, the State fails to appreciate the nature of the argument actually 
raised on appeal. Regardless of strict exactness in a demonstrative exhibit, such as the 
diagram here, "having the witness himself mark the diagram lends a certain spontaneity 
and credibility to the testimony. . . ." Michael P. Seng and William K. Carroll, 
Eyewitness Testimony: Strategies and Tactics, "Exhibits-Using exhibits,"§ 6:19, 2nd 
ed. (database updated Dec. 2013). Thus. it is the fact that the red Xs exist at all, and 
not whether they are perfectly precise, that is harmful. 
Similarly, it is the fact that diagram is drawn from a bird's eye view, and not 
Officer Cowell's actual point of view, rather than the strict accuracy of the items depicted 
from that viewpoint, that is harmful. Compare Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho at 764 (finding a 
demonstrative exhibit in a similar situation was relevant precisely because it was taken 
from the officer's viewpoint). As the State has offered no argument besides the 
correlation/causation fallacy in response to the argument actually raised in this regard, it 
has failed to carry its burden to prove the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Compare State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598-99 (2013). As a result, this Court 
should vacate the conviction based on the erroneous and not harmless admission of the 
irrelevant and improper diagram. 
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Ill. 
The Accumulated Errors In This Case Require Reversal Even If This Court Determines 
Them To Be Individually Harmless 
Although the State has failed to carry its burden and show any of the three errors 
in this case were individually harmless, this Court should also vacate the judgment of 
conviction because those three errors were cumulatively not harmless. The State's 
main argument in regard to cumulative error is simply an assertion that, since it believes 
there were no errors in the trial, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply. (Resp. 
Br., p.28.) However, as demonstrated infra, that belief is mistaken 
The State also contends, based on State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 149 (2014), 
that the weight of the other evidence somehow renders these errors harmless. (Resp. 
Br., p.34.) However, as the United States Supreme Court made clear in Sullivan, 
"[h]armless-error review looks, we have said, to the basis on which the jury actually 
rested its verdict. The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial without the error, 
a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually 
rendered in this trial was surely unattributible to the error." Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 
(internal quotation omitted, emphasis from original); cf. Joy, 155 Idaho at 11 (the Idaho 
Supreme Court reaffirming that the Sullivan explanation for harmless error review is the 
standard for reviewing harmless error in Idaho). The Sullivan Court explained, "[t]hat 
must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered-no 
matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be-would violate the 
jury-trial guarantee." Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 (emphasis added). Thus, the State's 
argument - that the guilty verdict is inescapable because of the other evidence 
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presented - is directly contrary to Sullivan. Therefore, that argument should be 
rejected. 
At any rate, the evidence is not as strong as the State believes. The primary 
issue in this case is one of credibility - namely, Officer Cowell's credibility. That was an 
issue for the jury to resolve since his testimony about being kicked in the groin was 
contradicted by two other officers. Yet, the combination of the prosecutor's 
inappropriate attempt to get the jury to reject the defense arguments based on the 
jurors' passion and prejudice and the inappropriate decision to allow Officer Cowell to 
use the unnecessary diagram, which bolstered his credibility, goes directly to the heart 
of that issue. Therefore, there is a reasonable probability that the cumulative effect of 
those errors contributed to the verdict in this case. Compare Joy, 155 Idaho at 11-12 
(reaching the same conclusion in a similar factual scenario). 
As such, the State has failed to carry its burden to prove that combination of 
errors harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 
953 (Ct. App. 2012) (applying the traditional harmless error test's rationale while 
evaluating a case for cumulative error). Therefore, even if those errors are individually 




Mr. Flowerdew respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of 
conviction in this case and remand the case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 13th day of October, 2015. 
~ 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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